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IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION AND SECTION 1983:
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY
Federal courts are seeing an increasing number of plaintiffs demanding
relief for alleged violations of federal statutes.' In any such action, one of the
fundamental threshold questions is whether the plaintiff has a "cause of
action."2
 When a plaintiff invokes a federal statute as the basis for his or her
claim, the court will determine that a cause of action exists if it finds that (1) the
statute expressly authorizes a private suit to enforce the specific rights created;'
(2) a private right of action is implied by the statute in issue; 4 or (3) the in-
dependent, express cause of action provided by 42 U.S, C. section 1983 ("sec-
tion 1983") 5
 encompasses the statute in issue. 6
 Whether a federal statute im-
plies a private right of action or whether the federal statute is encompassed by
section 1983 are the two threshold questions that have presented the Supreme
Court with the most difficulty. The court's effort to address these questions is
represented by two lines of cases. One line' reveals how the courts find an im-
plied private right of action under a federal statute which does not expressly
grant such an action. In these cases, the Court examines the statute's
' Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
22-23 & n.1 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2
 A "cause of action" has recently been defined by the Court as a "question of
whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, ap-
propriately invoke the power of the court...." Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 240 n.18
(1979). The Davis definition of a cause of action stands in contrast to the more familiar definitions
associated with threshold pleading requirements. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Com-
merce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 693 (1949) (the alleged invasion of recognized legal rights upon
which a litigant bases his claim for relief); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURES 2.9 at
75-76 (2d ed. 1977) ("a group of facts that give rise to one or more rights of relief"). Since "cause
of action" has multiple meanings, "right of action" has been used in the Davis sense and avoids
confusion with other possible meanings. For the purposes of this note, when "cause of action" or
"right of action" is used, the Davis definition is intended.
A cause of action or right of action, although a question of "who" may sue, is not to be
confused with the issue of standing, which is "a question of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently
adversary to a defendant to create an art. III case or controversy .... " Davis, 442 U.S. at 239
and 240 n.18. Like the ascertainment of a cause of action, a finding by the court that a particular
plaintiff has a right to relief is ostensibly not "on the merits;" rather, it is a condition precedent
to any decision on the merits.
See, e.g., Save Our Sound Fisheries Ass'n v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136, 1145
(D.R.1. 1977).
See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
42 U.S.C. S 1983 (Supp. III 1979). The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this sec-
tion, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
6 See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1979).
See infra text accompanying notes 14-80.
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language, structure, and legislative history to see if Congress intended to allow
a private right of action. The other line' has approached the question of a
private right of action under a silent federal statute by interpreting the broad
language of section 1983, which imposes liability upon any person acting under
color of state law who deprives another person of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 9 In this in-
stance, the Court has interpreted section 1983 to allow a private right of action
where the litigant alleges that his or her injury was the result of a violation of a
federal statute by one acting under color of state law. The two lines of cases
overlap to a certain extent. For example, a plaintiff may argue both that a
statute creates an implied right of action against the defendant and, when the
defendant has acted under color of state law, that the same statute creates a
substantive right enforceable by the express right of action provided by section
1983. A court could find, then, that while a statute does not provide a private
right of action for its enforcement, the statute itself vests rights in an individual
which are redressable under section 1983. 1 °
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Hal-
derman" and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Associa-
tion,' 2
 have addressed the interaction between implied rights of action and sec-
tion 1983. In each of these cases, the Court employed principles rooted in the
implied right of action analysis to limit the scope of section 1983 actions."
This note examines the framework the Supreme Court has established to
determine whether a federal cause of action lies under either an implied right of
action theory or section 1983. In the first section, the note examines the evolu-
tion of both the implied right of action analysis and section 1983 case law. The
watershed cases expounding the Court's implied right of action analysis will be
described, illustrating the Court's gradual narrowing of the implied right doc-
trine. The growth and current parameters of section 1983 as an express cause
of action then will be treated, with attention to the underlying purposes, scope,
and operative effect of the statute. The next section examines the paralleling of
the implied right of action and section 1983 lines of analysis in the Pennhurst and
Sea Clammers cases. Part II of this note presents a discussion of the Pennhurst and
Sea Clammers cases which focuses, in particular, on the congressional intent ele-
ment of the Court's section 1983 and implied rights Of action analysis. It will be
submitted that the governing principle in the Court's threshold search for an
" See infra text accompanying notes 81-148.
See supra note 5.
" The apparent paradox is more acute when the statute in question imposes obligations
upon both the federal and state governments and the plaintiff alleges that his injury is the result of
both federal and state actors. If the federal statute would allow a private right of action via section
1983 against the state, but preclude a private suit against the federal actor, the state would appear
to be inequitably exposed to liability. Ste, e.g., The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
" 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
12 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
13 See infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
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implied private right of action — the intent of Congress to provide or deny such
a right — is not the proper framework for deciding whether a section 1983 ac-
tion lies to remedy an alleged statutory violation. When applied to section
1983, the current intent analysis is fraught with the very same judicial specula-
tion it seeks to avoid and frustrates the underlying purpose of section 1983 as
previously articulated by the Court. Further, the Court's application of the im-
plied right of action analysis to section 1983 analysis inappropriately prevents
section 1983 from serving as an independent cause of action for abuses of state
power. Finally, an alternative "clear expression" test is endorsed in order to
shift the decision of whether section 1983 applies to specific statutes firmly into
the hands of Congress.
I. DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATUS OF JUDICIAL DOCTRINES REGARDING
IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION AND RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 1983.
A. Implied Private Right of Action
When a plaintiff asks a federal court to infer a private right of action from
a federal statute, the court, in essence, is being asked to create a species of tort
liability for the statute's violation." Rather than fashion interstitial rules pur-
suant to their common law power," the courts tend to address the existence of
a private remedy in light of carrying forward the purposes and intent of a
federal statute." This was not, however, always the case. For example, in the
decision where the Supreme Court first inferred a right of action from the
substantive provisions in a federal statute," the Court justified its action on the
common law theory that where there is a right, there is a remedy."
As will be seen," largely as a result of curtailments of the federal court's
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 874A and comment g (1979). `'A tort ac-
tion is the form of civil relief that grants damages or injunctive relief for harm wrongfully inflicted
upon or threatened to an interest of the injured party." Id. , comment f at 304. See also id. $ 870.
15 See generally C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS S 60 (3d ed.
1976). In discussing the federal common law subsequent to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), Wright states that:
Whether state law or federal law controls on matters not covered by the Constitu-
tion or an Act of Congress is a very complicated question, which yields to no
simple answer in terms of the parties to the suit, the basis of jurisdiction, or the
source of the right which is to be enforced. Whenever the federal court is free to
decide for itself the rule to be applied, and there are many such situations, it is ap-
plying, or making, "federal common law."
Id. at 279.
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 5 874A comment g, at 307.
" Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
18
 Id. at 39-40. The Court said:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the
right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied, according to a
doctrine of the common law .... This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus
ibi remedium.
Id.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 22-29.
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powers by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 20 as well as increased deference to con-
gressional actions, 2 ' the judiciary's willingness to infer private rights of action
from federal statutes has steadily declined. This section will analyze the devel-
opment of the current restrictive doctrines which are applied by the Court.
1. Doctrinal Development
The "presumption" 22 that a right of action is implied by any statute
enacted for the special benefit of a class of plaintiffs, adopted by the Supreme
Court in 1916, 23 did not withstand the redefined role of the federal courts
outlined in Erie twenty-two years later. 24
 Erie ostensibly marked the end of the
federal courts' power to fashion common law," except in very restricted cir-
cumstances." Thus, subsequent to Erie, the Court in Wheeldin v. Wheeler,"
recognized that inferring a right of action for damages in cases where Congress
did not clearly imply one was tantamount to fashioning a common law right
and .that after Erie, federal courts were restricted from fashioning such rights. 28
The Court stated that, except in areas primarily governed by federal law, and
where Congress delegated to it the power to fill in the interstices of a statute,
the judicial power did not permit federal courts to infer a private right of action
for an alleged violation of a federal statute."
Notwithstanding the limitation of the federal judicial power that the
Wheeldin Court derived from Erie, however, the Supreme Court, in/ /. Case Co.
v. Borak3° found an implied right of action in section 14(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act). 31 In Borak, a shareholder sought to collect
damages and to void a merger which allegedly had been accomplished through
the use of false and misleading proxy solicitation material." Although section
14(a), and the regulations promulgated thereunder made such proxy material
unlawful, the defendants denied that any private right of action existed under
section 14(a). 33 The Court, however, pointing to the broad remedial purposes
of the 1934 Act to protect investors, an express provision for federal court
jurisdiction over suits to enforce the 1934 Act, 34 and the salutory effect of
2° 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
" See infra text accompanying notes 45-80.
52 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 23 (Stevens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23 Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916). See supra note 18.
24 Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1963).
25 See supra note 15.
" See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943) (com-
mercial paper issued by United States is governed by federal law).
27 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
28 Id. at 651.
25 Id. at 651-52.
'° 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
3' 15 U.S.C. S 78n(a) (1958) (amended in 1964, 1968, 1970) (section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits false and misleading proxy solicitation material).
" 377 U.S. at 431-32.
" Id. at 431.
34 15 U.S.C. 78aa (1976).
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private actions to aid the existing agency enforcement scheme created by the
1934 Act, readily found a private right of action in favor of the shareholder."
The decision in Borak to infer a right of action from a procedural provision in a
statute which also provided a comprehensive enforcement scheme was later
analyzed by Justice Harlan as not premised on statutory construction. Rather,
Justice Harlan noted, Barak rests on the independent judicial power to provide
remedies in accordance with "substantive social policies embodied in an act of
positive law. "36
The Court's early presumption that a right of action is implied by a statute
conferring special benefit to a certain class of individuals, the federalism con-
cerns voiced by the Court in Wheeldin, and the Court's exercise of its power to
facilitate substantive social policies in Borak provided a broad if not contradic-
tory means of testing any particular statute for indications of potential private
relief. Thus, in its 1975 Cort v. Ash decision," the Court undertook to condense
all prior implied right of action cases into a four factor analysis. In Cort., the
stockholders of a corporation in a derivative suit sought damages against the
corporation's directors in reliance on a federal criminal statute which pro-
hibited corporations from making contributions in connection with presidential
elections." In analyzing whether the plaintiffs had a right of action, the Court
set out the following test:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted," that is, does the statute create a federal right in
favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative in-
tent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And final-
ly, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inap-
propriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 39
These four factors — the provision of a right, the intent of Congress, the
legislative purposes and the balance of federalism — were derived, in essence,
from prior cases addressing implied private rights of .action." The Court, on
the facts and the statute at issue, found that none of the four factors supported
an implied private right of action for damages under the federal criminal
statute."
The Cant test can be seen as at once liberal and restrictive. On the one
hand, it seems to set up a broad range of considerations that courts may ex-
" 377 U.S. at 431-34.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402 n.4 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
" 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
" 18 U.S.C. S 610 (1970 & Supp. III 1973) (repealed 1976).
39
 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in the original) (citations omitted).
40
 The Court cited, inter alia, cases cited supra notes 23, 26, 30, 36.
41 Core, 422 U.S. at 80-85.
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amine to determine whether a statute implies a private right of action.
Moreover, the first three factors — which require a perusal of the legislative
history to determine the existence of a special class, Congress' remedial intent,
and the underlying purposes of the statute — confer great discretion on the
courts since they each allow for judicial creativity. On the other hand, the test
also might be considered restrictive since, as recognized by Justice Stevens,
"multifactor balancing tests generally tend to produce negative
answers.... "42
 In operation, although the lower courts have found that the
Cort factors make it easier to find an implied private right of action,'" the
Supreme Court has more often than not declined to infer a private right of ac-
tion."
2. Post-Cort Developments
Discontent with what was seen as the Cort "open invitation"" to judicial
legislation surfaced in the Supreme Court's Cannon v. University of Chicago deci-
sion." In Cannon the Court was asked to'find a private right of action in section
901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 47 in order to remedy
an allegedly discriminatory rejection of a medical school application." The
plaintiff in Cannon had alleged that a medical school which received federal
financial assistance had denied her application because she was a woman."
" Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
43 See, e.g., Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 592 F.2d 617, 621-23 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (section 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Riggle v. Califor-
nia, 577 F.2d 579, 582-83 (9th Cir. 1978) (Rivers & Harbors Appropriations Act); Lewis v.
Transamerica Corp., 575 F.2d 237, 238-39 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part, aff'd in part and
remanded, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Davis v. Southeastern Com-
munity College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1159 (4th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (section 504 of
Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Wilson v. First Houston Inv, Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1238-43 (5th
Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 444 U.S. 959 (1979) (section 206 of Investment Advisers Act of
1950); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 568
F.2d 478, 483-84 (6th Cir. 1977) (section 11(e) of Federal Home Loan Bank Act); Abrahamson
v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 872-76 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) (section 206 of
Investment Advisers Act of 1940); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co. Inc., 534 F.2d 156, 166
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976) (section 6 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934). But see,
e.g., Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 611 F.2d 1074, 1078-85 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 889 (1980)
(section 503 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
44
 See, e.g., Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13-18 (Federal Water Pollution Control Act and
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. 1, 11-27 (Developmen-
tally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975); Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v.
Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 767-84 (1981) (Davis-Bacon Act); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
316-17 (1979) (Trade Secrets Act); Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 430 U.S. 1, 24-32, reh'g
denied, 430 U.S. 976 (1977) (section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). See also
Supreme Court cases cited supra note 43. But see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
688-719 (1979) (Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972).
" Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
46
 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
" 20 U.S.C.	 1681 (1976).
4$ 441 U.S. at 680 & n.2.
49 Id. at 680.
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This denial, she claimed, was a violation of section 901(a) which prohibits
gender discrimination by education programs receiving federal financial aid."
Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, analyzed the statute according to
the four factor Cort test and found that each factor supported the inference of a
private right of action. 5 ' Thus, the plaintiff's complaint was held to state a
cause of action. 52
Justice Powell, in dissent, urged a complete abandonment of the Cort test
and proposed that a private right of action never be found unless there is "most
compelling evidence" that Congress actually intended one." According to
Powell, since article III of the federal constitution grants to Congress the sole
responsibility to determine the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Court
must refrain from creating remedies which necessarily enlarge the court's
jurisdiction." Thus, he asserted that the question at issue was not the existence
of a legal right but, rather, the existence of a threshold right of the particular in-
dividual to invoke the enforcement power of the courts." By inferring a right of
action, Powell admonished, the judiciary was in effect assuming the policy-
making authority constitutionally vested in Congress." Further, he regarded
the implied private right of action doctrine as ultimately encouraging Congress
to avoid hard political choices — choices with which the courts are even less
prepared to deal — which in turn increases the judiciary's exercise of govern-
mental power." By characterizing the Con/ implied private right of action as an
unconstitutional jurisdictional affront, Powell shifted the focus of the Court's
inquiry away from considerations of whether the implied remedy would further
the statute's remedial purpose towards considerations of whether the Court
would be within its constitutionally and statutorily limited jurisdiction in hear-
ing the case.
5" Id. at 680-83.
" Id. at 688-717. As to the first Core factor, the Court found that the statute's express
language — persons denied participation on the basis of sex — was focused on a benefited class
and not merely a simple ban on discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds. Id. at
689-94. On the second factor, the Court found no evidence of any Congressional intent to deny a
private right of action and, instead, found strong support that a private right was intended given
that comparable language in a predecessor statute and another statute had been judicially con-
strued to provide a private right of action before the statute in issue was enacted. Id. at 694-703.
Weighing the third Core factor, the Court found a private remedy was helpful to the statutory pur-
pose of providing effective protection to individual citizens. Id. at 704-08. Lastly, the Court cur-
sorily noted that the protection of citizens against invidious discrimination had been the task of
the Federal government and courts since the Civil War and thus not in conflict with an area
basically the concern of the States. Id. 708-09. Justice White, on the other hand, found that the
legislative history and the statutory scheme did not show Congress intended any private enforce-
ment of the Act. Id. at 718-19 (White, J., dissenting).
•
	 52 Id. at 717 .
" Id. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 743 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57 Id. at 743-44 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Echoes of Powell's strong dissent in Cannon resounded in Supreme Court
majority opinions soon afterwards. In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington; 58 the
Court addressed whether a customer of a brokerage firm had an implied
private right of action based on section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 39 The plaintiff in Touche Ross sought damages against accountants who
had improperly performed an audit required by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 60 While holding that section 17(a) did not provide the plaintiffs with a
private right of action, the court modified the test it had outlined in Cort v.
Ash. 6 ' According to Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, Cort had not man-
dated that the four factors be accorded equal weight. 62 Rather, the central in-
quiry, Rehnquist believed, was whether Congress explicitly or implicitly intend-
ed to create a private cause of action. 63 Further, Rehnquist noted, the first three
factors of Cori, which emphasized the language and focus of the statute, its
legislative history, and its purpose, were traditional methods of determining
legislative intent." Writing for the Court, Rehnquist found that the "plain
language" 65 and structure" of the statute in issue, together with a silent
legislative history" indicated a lack of any congressional intent to provide a
private right of action.
In refusing to infer a private right of action from section 17(a), the majori-
ty also adopted a rule of statutory construction somewhat different from that
used by the Borak Court. In Borak, a comprehensive statutory remedial scheme
was found to be evidence of a broad remedial purpose in the legislation, which
in turn supported the inference of a private right of action." In Touche Ross,
however, Justice Rehnquist and the majority held that the complex statutory
scheme of remedies expressly provided in the statute was evidence that no addi-
tional remedies were intended."
Soon after Touche Ross, Justice Stewart writing for the majority in Trans-
america Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 7° reaffirmed Justice Rehnquist's distilla-
" 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
59 15 U.S.C. 5 78q(a) (1970) (amended 1975).
60 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 562.
" Id. at 575.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 575-76.
65 Id. at 571. Rehnquist interpreted the specific section as a record keeping provision
which neither prohibited any specific conduct nor created any federal rights in favor of private
parties. Id. at 569.
66 The provision in issue was flanked by sections which did expressly grant comprehen-
sive private rights of action for other violations. Id. at 571-72.
6? Id.
68 Borah, 377 U.S. at 431-35.
69
 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571-72, 578. "Obviously, then, when Congress'wished to
provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly." Id. at 572. This
structural inference was precisely the kind of "extrapolation of legislative intent" Justice Stevens
had rejected earlier in Cannon, 441 U.S. at 711.
70
 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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tion of the first three Cori factors into a consideration of congressional intent."'
Although the Court in Transamerica found language in the contested statute that
said it was intended to benefit the class of litigants to which the plaintiff be-
longed,'2 the Court treated the question of intent to create a private right of ac-
tion as separate." Since the legislative history was silent as to a private right of
action, 74 the Court again turned to a consideration of the scheme of judicial
and administrative remedies supplied in the statute to shed light on Congress'
intent." Applying the "elemental canon of statutory construction that where a
statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be
chary of reading others into it, "76 the Court found that no private right of ac-
tion was intended!" Justice Powell, in a one sentence concurrence, noted that
the majority opinion in Transamerica was compatible with his dissent in Cannon
which had urged an abandoning of the four factor Cort test and a higher
threshold showing that Congress intended a private right of action before one
was judicially inferred. 75 Thus, the maxim ubi jus ibi rernedium was replaced by
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 79
As discussed above, the Court's search for an implied private right of ac-
tion now largely focuses on the intent of Congress to create or preclude private-
ly enforceable rights. In searching for intent, the plain language of the act, its
structure, and the legislative history are all drawn upon by the Court. As a tool
of construction, the Court has focused its intent analysis on the express
remedial scheme of the statute. It then has applied a rule of construction which
negates a private implied remedy whenever remedies are expressly provided as
" Id. at 15-16. The issue was whether the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which was
enacted to deal with abuses in the investment advisers industry, creates a private cause of action
for damages or other relief in favor of persons aggrieved by those who allegedly have violated it.
Id. at 12-13.
72 Id. at 17. Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act broadly proscribes fraudulent
practices by investment advisers in transactions with clients or prospective clients. Id. at 16-17.
" Id. at 18.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 19-22.
76 Id. at 19. The Court cited Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289
(1929) (interpreting Revenue Acts); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970); Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419 (1975) (Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970);. T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471 (1959) (Motor Carrier Act of 1935).
"7 444 U.S. at 24.
" Id. at 25.
79 Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 611 F.2d 1074, 1085 (5th Cir. 1980) (where there is a right
there is a remedy replaced by the expression of one thing implies exclusion of another).
The Touche Ross and Transamerica "intent" analysis remains, for the time being, the
backbone of the Court's implied right of action analysis in subsequent decisions. Compare Univer-
sities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981) (restating the Cori test as
restricted by Touche Ross to require the courts to examine (1) the statute's language and focus, (2)
its legislative history, and (3) its purpose, in order to discern congressional intent) with California
v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293, 296 (1981) (citing the Cart test in full but relying only on the
first two Cort factors and the failure to provide any statutory enforcement scheme as indicative of
Congress' lack of intent to provide a private right of action).
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in Transamerica and Touche Ross." The Court has replaced the assumption that
any wrong should have a judicial remedy with the premise that all decisions
regarding the availability of federal remedies should be made by Congress.
Consequently, the Court is now very reluctant to fill the perennial interstitial
gaps in federal legislation.
The barriers imposed by the Court's present implied rights analysis to
litigants seeking to redress alleged violations of federal statutes are formidable
and necessarily direct such litigants to consider other rights of action. As the
next section will discuss, section 1983 provides access to the federal courts in
certain situations, namely where the plaintiff alleges a violation of his or her
federal rights by a defendant acting under color of state law. Although the im-
plied right of action analysis applies when the defendant is a private, federal, or
state actor, section 1983 expressly gives private litigants the right to invoke the
power of the court where federal rights are violated by a person acting under
color of state law. Even where a plaintiff has no implied right of action, then,
section 1983 may provide the plaintiff with an express cause of action to redress
a violation of a federal statute.
B. Section 1983: An Express Private Right of Action
Section 1983" creates an express remedy for parties whose rights are
deprived by persons acting under color of state law in contravention of the
Constitution or laws of the United States." Section 1983 was originally con-
tained in section one of the "Ku Klux Klan Act," 83 a civil rights statute
enacted in 1871 in response to the violent terrorism in the Reconstruction
South perpetrated by the Klan and unhampered by local state officials." It was
enacted under the aegis of section five of the fourteenth amendment which
gives to Congress the power to enact laws to enforce the other provisions of the
amendment. 85 Although it laid dormant for nearly ninety years because of
restrictive judicial construction, 86 section 1983 received new vitality in 1961
when the Supreme Court expanded its applicability in Monroe v. Pape." This
section sketches certain historical developments of section 1983. Specifically,
the section will discuss the various purposes underlying the statute. Next, it
will address the recent extension of section 1983 liability to include not only ac-
tions by state officials but actions by local governmental entities as well. It also
will note the imposition of liability for acts which violate federal statutory law
as well as constitutional law. Lastly, the nature of the section 1983 right of ac-
tion will be explained.
°a Or when not provided as in California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 296 (1981).
81 42 U.S.C.	 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
82 See supra note 5.
" Chapter 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
" Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 610 n.25 (1979).
" Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961).
" Developments in the Law — Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1135-36
(1977).
" 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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1. The Purposes of Section 1983
As a result of the sweeping language used by Congress in section 1983, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly turned to the underlying purposes of the section
in seeking to determine the statute's proper meaning and scope. 89 The starting
point for such inquiries into the purposes of section 1983 has traditionally been
the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the "Ku Klux Klan
Act, " 89 the precursor of the current version of section 1983. 90 There was,
however, little discussion at the time of enactment of the particular section of
the "Ku Klux Klan Act" which later became section 1983. 9 ' Nevertheless, ac-
cording to the Monroe Court's analysis, the purposes behind the act from which
section 1983 originated" suggest that the Reconstruction Congress intended to
protect federal rights in the federal courts as an alternative to the perceived
unreliability of state courts." In light of the breadth of these purposes, the
Monroe Court found that section 1983 did give a federal cause of action to a par-
ty deprived of his rights by a state official's abuse of power" even if the plaintiff
could have brought suit in the state court for the state official's failure to act in
conformity with the laws of the state as well." The Court found, in other
words, that the failure of the defendant to act in conformity with state law did
not preclude a finding that his conduct was "state action."
In more recent cases, the Court has de-emphasized section 1983's provi-
sion of a federal forum. Instead, the Court has concentrated on the functional
purposes of section 1983 which, in essence, allow section 1983 to protect in-
dividual federal rights. Thus, section 1983 has been characterized as serving
the purposes of deterrence, punishment, and compensation as opposed to
merely providing an alternative forum." Section 1983 deters the potential
abuse of power by persons acting under color of state law for all such persons
before acting in a way which violates anyone's federally protected rights must
88 See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74.
89 Section 1 of the CiVil Rights Act of 1971, Chapter 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (Ku Klux
Klan Act).
9° See, e.g., the extensive historical debates in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 14-19
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635-36 (1980);
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172-92; id. at 192-202 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 204-19, 225-37
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
91 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7 (1980).
92 The Court saw three related purposes behind the Act. One purpose was to override
state discriminatory legislation which might endanger the rights and privileges of its citizens.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173. A second, related purpose was to provide a remedy where state law was
inadequate (e.g., discriminatory laws providing that blacks could not testify against whites). Id.
at 173-74. A third, broader purpose was to 'Iprcivide a federal remedy where the state remedy,
though adequate in theory, was not available in practice." Id. at 174. This federal remedy, the
Court held, was supplemental and did not require the exhaustion of the state avenues of relief.
Id. at 183.
93 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 155 (1978).
" Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
" Id. at 183.
96 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 453 U.S. 247, 252 (1981).
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consider the possibility of later being a defendant in a section 1983 action. 97
Section 1983 punishes the actual wrongdoer by allowing the courts to award
money damages against him. Lastly, section 1983 compensates the victim by
making a damage award available. In sum, by allowing a private right of ac-
tion, section 1983 serves to protect an individual's federal rights before they are
violated as well as after they are violated.
The differences between the original purposes of protecting federal civil
rights with a federal forum and the more specific purposes now understood as
essential to section 1983 reveal the great distance section 1983 has travelled.
Although the concerns of the Reconstruction Congress which gave rise to the
"Ku Klux Klan Act" would suggest a narrower interpretation, the "ambu-
latory" 98 language of section 1983 has provided a vehicle for the courts to read
contemporary concerns into the statute. Yet, the process of creating law from
the broad language of a statute is not, as Justice Frankfurter noted in Monroe,
the most effective means of protecting human liberties, for it requires the
judiciary to make policy decisions which are more properly the task of the
legislature. 99 Further, in the modern world of cooperative federalism, i.e.
federal statutory programs which mandate the sharing of responsibilities by
both federal and state actors, the protection of an individual's rights from
abuses of power has been qualified and integrated into larger statutory schemes
which provide their own review and enforcement mechanisms. For example,
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,'°° specifically provides that "citizen
suits" may be brought under the Act by a person adversely affected by a viola-
tion of the Act. 10 '
Thus, where the alleged wrongdoer while under color of state law has
violated a federal statute, any decision by the Court to recognize a federal
statutory right and to remedy the abuse of power with section 1983 may lead the
Court into conflict with the remedial provisions of the statute in issue. If the
statute in issue contains its own remedial provisions, the Court would have to
decide that, of the two congressional enactments, section 1983 takes prec-
edence.
2. Growth of Section 1983 Liability
Once the purposes of section 1983 to provide a federal forum to in-
dividuals whose federal rights have been violated and to deter abuses of power
by individual actors under color of state law have been established, the Court
uses these purposes to determine the meaning and scope of the language of sec-
tion 1983. Thus, the issues of who were actors under color of state law, what
97
 Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 (1978).
98 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 244 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 243-44 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
100
 33 U.S.C. S 1251 et seq. (1976 and Supp. 111.1979).
t°' See 33 U.S.C. S 1365 (1976 and Supp. III 1979).
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actions violated a person's rights and what rights or harms were redressable
under the section received the Court's attention in a variety of cases. This part
briefly sets out some of the contours of liability under section 1983.
The principal issue in the seminal Monroe case was whether Congress in-
tended section 1983 to be a remedy for deprivations caused by an official's
abuse of power.'° 2
 Plaintiffs had sought relief under section 1983 to compensate
them for an unreasonable search and seizure by city police officers in con-
travention of the fourth amendment. 103
 The narrow issue was whether such
conduct by state officials could be "under color of " state law and thus ac-
tionable under section 1983 even if the police officers' acts were forbidden by
state law. 704
 In light of the purposes of section 1983 105
 and cases interpreting
criminal statutes with language similar to the "under color of" language in
section 1983, 106
 the Court answered in the affirmative and reversed the appeals
court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint."' Thus, the complaint was
deemed to state a cause of action against the officers for their allegedly illegal
actions under section 1983. 108
The city that employed the police officers was also named as a de-
fendant. 108
 Examining the legislative history of section 1983, however, the
Court found that Congress did not intend to expose municipal corporations to
liability."° Hence, the Court concluded that municipalities are not "persons"
within the meaning of section 1983, and it dismissed the claim against the
Justice Frankfurter, in a lengthy dissent addressing the majority's finding
that the police officers acted "under color of" state law, urged a narrow inter-
pretation of the "under color of ' language on the ground that there was more
at stake than abstract statutory construction.'" The decision to include illegal
acts as "under color of" state law, he said, is an issue that raises critical con-
stitutional issues of federalism.'" Extending section 1983 to reach actions that
were not even authorized by the states, Frankfurter noted, would invite conflict
avoidable only by the exercise of judicial restraint and would result in substan-
tial federal oversight of the administration of local policies." 4 Despite
I° 2 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172.
100 Id. at 169-71 (as made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause).
104 Id. at 183-87.
103 See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
106 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107-13 (1945); United States v.
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
107 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 & 192.
'OS Id. at 187.
109 Id. at 170.
10 Id. at 187-91.
'1 Id. at 191-92.
"2 Id. at 202 and 222.
" 3 Id. at 222.
114 Id. at 241-42.
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Frankfurter's warnings, section 1983 rapidly became the vehicle for redressing
a large number of harms inflicted by state actors in a wide variety of
contexts." 5 Moreover, the majority of these cases were brought in the federal
courts," 6 thus creating situations of conflict between the federal courts and
state actors.
In 1978, seventeen years after Monroe, the finding that municipalities were
not "persons" subject to liability under section 1983 was overruled in Monell v.
Department of Social Services."' In Monell, several pregnant municipal employees
who were compelled to take unpaid leaves of absence sued the city of New York
under section 1983 for unlawful gender discrimination.'" A reconsideration of
the legislative history of section 1983 compelled the Court to conclude that
Congress indeed had intended that local governmental units be "persons"
within the meaning of section 1983. 19 The Court noted, however, that liability
will only attach to such governmental units if the wrongful action was taken
pursuant to an official municipal policy which itself violates the federal con-
stitution rather than merely being the result of an employee's tortious act. ' 2 °
The contours of the new municipal liability are still in the process of being
defined. The Court has since held in Owen v. City of Independence, 121 that local
governmental units are not entitled to a qualified immunity defense based on
the good faith of their policy making officials.' 22 Dissenting in Owen, Justice
Powell contended that the abolition of the immunity defense increases local
governments' exposure to an extent tantamount to the imposition of strict
liability.'" But relief against a local governmental unit is not unlimited. For
example, a municipality is not liable for punitive damages under section 1983,
in contrast to other section 1983 defendants.' 2* Despite the official policy lim-
itation and the punitive damages prohibition, the potential exposure of local gov-
ernmental units and their employees to section 1983 actions is a stark reality.
116 See generally 1 C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS 55 116-208 (1980) (listing
92 categories of rights actionable under section 1983).
" 6
 In the twelve months ending June 30, 1980, some 12,944 cases were filed in the
federal courts under civil rights statutes including section '1983 (exclusive of the 13,000 prisoner
petitions filed). Director of Administrative Office of the United States Courts Ann. Rep.
A16-A17, Table C-2 (1980). In 1961, there were only 296 cases filed. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 27
n.16 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
117
 436 U.S. 658, 662-663 (1978).
11 B Id. at 660-61.
119 Id. at 690. "Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here, the action that is alleged to be un-
constitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision of-
ficially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Id.
"° Id. at 691 (respondeat superior theory not applicable in 5 1983 actions).
121
 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (police chief terminated without hearing and slandered by city
manager alleged deprivation of due process rights).
1" Id. at 650.
'" Id. at 658 (Powell, J., dissenting).
124
 City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). In this case, a con-
cert promoter was denied punitive damages for the city's cancellation of an entertainment license
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The precise meaning of the language "and laws in section 1983 has also
received attention by the Court. 129 Section 1983 only creates a right of action if
the plaintiff alleges a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States. Although numerous cases have dealt with constitutional
rights violated by actors under color of state law, until recently, little direct at-
tention was accorded to violations of federal statutory rights. 126
In Maine v. Thiboutot,'" in an opinion written by Justice Brennan, the
Court held that the reference to "laws" in section 1983 is not limited to civil
rights or equal protection laws but rather it embraces all federal statutory
laws.'" The plaintiffs in Thiboutot brought suit against the state and the state
Commissioner of Human Services alleging that they had been deprived of
welfare benefits to which they were entitled under the federal Social Security
Act by the state's wrongful interpretation of a specific section of the Act.' 29
Relying on precedent, which had assumed that statutory violations were re-
mediable under section 1983,"° the "plain language" of the Act,"' and the in-
conclusive nature of the section's legislative history,'" the Court interpreted
which amounted to content-based censorship and a violation of free expression and due process
under color of state law. Id. at 252-54, 271. This result, the Court determined, was consonant
with history and public policy. Id. at 271. The historical justification was that the enacting Con-
gress had intended to leave in place the common law immunities of municipalities from punitive
damages. Id. at 258-66. As to public policy, the burden of such an award ultimately would fall on
the community and individual taxpayers. Id. at 270.
"5 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1979).
126 See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 n.3 (1968) ("We intimate no views as to
whether and under what circumstances suits challenging state AFDC provisions only on the
ground that they are inconsistent with the federal statute may be brought in federal courts.");
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979) (The Court did not decide
whether "claimants are correct that section 1983 provides a cause of action for all federal
statutory claims.... ").
127 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
128 Id. at 4 & 6.
129 Id. at 2-3 (42 U.S.C. 5 602(a)(7)(1976)).
l" Id. at 4-6. The Court cited Rosado v. Wyman, 387 U.S. 397 (1970); Edelman v. Jor-
dan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
131
 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4 & 6.
"2 It at 7-8. Section 1 of the "Ku Klux Klan" Act of 1871 provided jurisdiction and a
cause of action for deprivations of constitutional rights only. Chapter 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). The
section was split-up and codified by an 1874 statutory revision into a remedial section, Rev, Stat.
1979 (the forerunner of 1983) and into two jurisdictional sections, Rev. Stat. 55 563(12) and
629(16) (the latter the forerunner of 28 U.S.C. 5 1343(3)). Section 629(16) applied to rights
secured by the Constitution or "by any law providing fo'r equal rights." Section 1979 referred to
rights secured by the Constitution "and laws," and 5 563(12) applied to rights secured by the
Constitution or "by any law of the United States." Brennan felt the statutory history was not
definitive, Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 7, while Powell argued that the broader phrasings contained in
1979 were inadvertent and not intended. Id. at 16 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell further argued
that the narrow range of the jurisdictional statute should defeat any broader reading of the
remedial section for a crucial purpose of the remedial section was to provide a federal forum. Id.
at 20-22. The elimination of the jurisdictional amount in 28 U.S.C. 5 1331 by the Federal Ques-
tion Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 5 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369, will
minimize the anomalous effect of Thiboutot, which had briefly created an actionable federal right
redressable only in the state courts.
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section 1983 to provide a cause of action and relief to those alleging deprivation
of federal statutory rights.'"
Justice Powell, in dissent, severely criticized the transformation of purely
statutory claims into "civil rights" actions under section 1983,'" apparently
taking the view that section 1983 should provide a right of action only for civil
rights statutes. Such a dramatic expansion of state and local government
liability, he declared, ignored the history of section 1983, logical statutory in-
terpretation and public policy' 35
 and created a major federal intrusion into
state sovereignty. 136
 One of the most egregious problems, predicted Powell,
would be that state and local governments would now be open to attack
whenever a person based a claim for an injury on the maladministration of any
federal-state cooperative program.'" Moreover, even where the state and
federal governments might both be culpable, he stated, only the state and its
subdivisions were open to suit under section 1983 while suits against federal of-
ficials and agencies could be maintained only in the "relatively rare case"
where a cause of action could be inferred from the statute at issue.'" Justice
Powell concluded his opinion with an appendix listing a small sample of the
many federal-state regulatory and social welfare enactments which could now
give rise to actionable "civil rights" under section 1983.'"
With Monell's expansion of section 1983 liability to local governmental en-
tities, Owen's abrogation of a qualified good faith immunity, and Thiboutot's in-
clusion of statutory non-civil rights violations as sufficient to invoke a section
1983 remedy, the increased potential liability of municipalities or local govern-
mental entities under section 1983 is starkly clear. Further, with the existing
federal legislation addressing complex social problems necessitating state in-
volvement, and the expansion of the federal question jurisdiction to no longer
foreclose actions with less than $10,000 in controversy,H° more and more
litigants will turn to the federal courts for relief.
3. A Section 1983 Right of Action
This part of the comment will describe how section 1983 serves as a right
of action."' In addition, it will explore the broader implications and effects of
such an express right of action.
13 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4. The Court also held that 42 U.S.C. 5 1988, which provides
a successful section 1983 plaintiff in federal courts a right to recover attorney's fees, was ap-
plicable in a state court proceeding. Id. at 8-11.
"4 Id. at 11-12 (Powell, J., with Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133
 Id. at 12.
16 Id. at 33.
1 " Id. at 22.
"a Id. at 24. Even if a private right of action against the federal official exists, plaintiffs
would still focus on the state to obtain attorney's fees under 5 1988. Id.
139 See id. at 34-37.
14° Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 5
2(a), 94 Stat. 2369 (amending 28 U.S.C. section 1331),
141
 Although the Court tends to discuss the operation of 5 1983 as a cause of action, it is
simpler to describe the operation of S 1983 as a right of action. See supra note 2.
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To recover under section 1983, one typically must show (1) a deprivation
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that
the defendant's act creating the deprivation was "under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory. P142 By its
terms, section 1983 imposes liability on a wrongdoer in an "action at law,
equity or other proper proceeding." Section 1983, by providing a remedy for
certain deprivations, implicitly acknowledges the existence of a body of
substantive federal rights inuring to the plaintiff when he is harmed by such
deprivations. Yet it "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United
States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes."'" Thus, section
1983 does not create rights but rather recognizes the redressable nature of the
deprivation of rights created elsewhere.'" In a manner of speaking, however,
such recognition creates a right in itself: the right to relief from such depriva-
tions. In other words, section 1983 provides a right to a cause of action; it iden-
tifies a class of litigants that can, as Congress provided, appropriately invoke
the power of the Federal Courts.
Although section 1983 may be only a vehicle to a remedy, it can be seen
also as creating a species of tort liability since it creates liability for certain
culpable conduct by those acting under color of state law.' 45 Yet, when a
specific deprivation and injury had to be linked to a constitutional right, section
1983 was said not to create a body of general federal tort law.'" But the "con-
stitutional shoals'"" have been undermined by the Thiboutot expansion, in ef-
fect, creating a potential field of federal tort liability for state actors based on
federal statutory rights. This linkage with the constitutional or statutory
spheres, necessary to maintain a section 1983 action and give the action its
substantive content, gives section 1983 tremendous potential reach.
By identifying the defendant, the plaintiff, the injury, and the relief in
broad generic terms, section 1983 can be seen as providing a federal framework
to resolve the myriad disputes between the individual and the state which en-
compass the federal government's ordering of permissible infringements on in-
dividual federal rights. But the breadth of section 1983, which is its strength, is
simultaneously an inherent weakness. When presented with a section 1983
claim, the court is required to determine which substantive rights are involved
' 42
 Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
143
 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979).
144 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). "(0)ne can-
not go into court and claim a 'violation of S 1983' — for S 1983 by itself does not protect anyone
against anything." Id.
146 Owen, 445 U.S. at 635. Accord Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187 (section 1983 "should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural conse-
quences of his actions."). Thus 5 1983 is construed in harmony with general principles of tort
law. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976).
146
 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1976). Cf. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
146 (1979).
' 47
 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 701.
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since section 1983 only applies when some person has been deprived of such
rights. As the Court must decide which rights are involved, the ultimate issue
of whether the alleged injury is remediable under section 1983 is placed firmly
in its hands. In this light, section 1983 could be seen as little more than a
jurisdictional statute which gives the court the power to look at a certain kind of
case. Moreover, with the expansion of federal question jurisdiction,'" section
1983, as applied to federal statutory violations, may be little more 'than the
statement of a truism: any plaintiff who alleges a violation of a federal statute
states a federal question and gains admittance to the federal courts.
C. The Relationship Between Implied Rights of Action and Section 1983
Whether a federal statute implies a private right of action and whether the
same federal statute is encompassed by section 1983 are two seemingly separate
questions which can and do overlap. The elemental inquiry in the implied right
of action cases is whether the plaintiff is a member of a class which may enforce
the rights created or protected by the statute in question.' 49 In other words, the
question is who may use the power of the court to enforce statutory rights.' 50
Section 1983, in contrast, creates an express right of action which ostensibly
answers the generalized question of "who" can enforce a statutory right with a
description: any person deprived of rights by one acting under color of state
law."' If a plaintiff can establish that he comes within the terms of section
1983, the right to invoke the court's power is essentially mandated by Congress
rather than judicially inferred.
Since section 1983 is a statutory right of action, it would seem to be a
preferred vehicle for relief. Nevertheless, there remains the problem of the
overlap of section 1983 analysis with implied rights analysis. The implied right
of action analysis, with its search for the congressional intent to allow or
preclude a privately sought judicial remedy within a legislative scheme, would,
at first surmise, seem to be unnecessary in light of section 1983's automatic
grant of power to those parties falling within its scope. Although in a proper
fact pattern both analyses are applicable, the express right of action of section
1983 is potentially an easier route than the implied right of action reached by
way of inference and statutory construction. If this analysis is correct, a section
1983 cause of action would render the court's threshold private right of action
inquiry unnecessary as the congressional intent of the statute in issue would be
subsumed by the larger sphere of affirmative intent manifested by the right of
action granted by section 1983. Nonetheless, difficult questions remain as to
the relationship of section 1983, implied rights of action, and federal statutes.
Not very long after Thiboutot, the Court was presented with two oppor-
148 See supra note 140.
149 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. at 239.
i5o
15 ' See supra note 5.
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tunities to discuss the parallel applicability of the implied right of action
analysis and section 1983 as alternative methods of entry into the federal
courts. Both cases, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Haldernzan" 2 and Mid-
dlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,'" involved
alleged violations by state defendants of state obligations imposed by specific
federal-state statutory schemes of the kind set out by justice Powell in his ap-
pendix in Thiboutot.'" This section sets out these two cases in detail, and
focuses specific attention on how the Court treats the threshold cause or right of
action issues in each case.
1. Pennhurst
In Pennhurst, the primary issue presented to the Supreme Court involved a
determination of the scope and meaning of a complex joint federal-state
statute, the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of
1975.' 55 The plaintiff, a retarded minor, was a resident of the defendant state
institution, Pennhurst State School and Hospital. She had originally brought a
class action in the federal district court claiming that the allegedly unsanitary,
inhumane, and dangerous conditions at Pennhurst were (1) a denial of due
process and equal protection, (2) cruel and unusual punishment, and (3) a
denial of statutory rights conferred by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
Developmentally Disabled Act, and a Pennsylvania statute.' 56 The district
court found, inter alia, that mentally retarded individuals have a constitutional
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" in the "least restrictive environ-
ment," and that the conditions at Pennhurst violated these rights."' The
Court entered a detailed order providing that new arrangements be made.'"
The court of appeals substantially affirmed the remedy but avoided the con-
stitutional claims by resting their decision on the Developmentally Disabled
Act, 159 notably section 6010: 160 a "bill of rights" provision calling for "ap-
133 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
183 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
14 Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 34-37.
'" Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 5. The statute in issue was 42 U.S.C. 6000 et seq. (1976 and
Supp. III) (hereinafter Developmentally Disabled Act).
1 " 451 U.S. at 6.
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 4415 F. Supp. 1295, 1319-1320
(E.D. Pa. 1977). The district court also found constitutional rights to be free from harm and
discriminatory habilitation, a state statutory right to minimally adequate habilitation, and a
federal statutory right to non-discriminatory habilitation. Id. at 1320-24.
'" Id. at 1326-29.
" 6
 Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 94, 95-100 & 116 (3d
Cir. 1979).
' 60
 42 U.S.C. 5 6010 (1976) (amended 1978). It states in relevant part:
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of persons with
developmental disabilities:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment,
services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
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propriate treatment, services and habilitation" in the setting that was "least
restrictive on the person's liberty." 161 Using a Cart analysis, 162 the court of ap-
peals found an implied private right to be available to the plaintiff as a vehicle
for enforcing these rights.'"
The Supreme Court, with Justice Rehnquist speaking for the five member
majority, first held that there were no substantive rights within the Devel-
opmentally Disabled Act to support an implied right of action.'" In deciding
that there were no substantive rights created by the Act, the Court first ex-
amined whether Congress could have created enforceable rights and obliga-
tions.'" In other words, did Congress have the power to legislate such rights or
obligations? 166
 As possible sources for the congressional power to legislate,
Justice Rehnquist examined the statute as grounded in both section five of the
fourteenth amendment"' and the spending clause. 168 Rather than immediately
examining the scope of section five of the fourteenth amendment, Justice
Rehnquist first considered what the test should be for determining when Con-
gress intends to enforce the fourteenth amendment.'" Because of the special
nature of section five legislation, in that it imposes federal policy on a state in-
voluntarily and intrudes on state authority, the Court would not assume that
Congress had acted pursuant to this power where the intent to do so was not
express.'" As to the spending power, the Court found that precedent stated
that such legislation was in the form of a contract and required that, for any
obligations to be imposed on a state by funding statute, they must be express,
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental
disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the per-
son and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's
personal liberty.
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation to assure that
public funds are not provided to any institutioni] 	 that — (A) does not provide
treatment, services, and habilitation which is appropriate to the needs of such per-
son; or (B) does not meet [certain} minimum standards....
Id.
Id.
t62 Ste supra text accompanying notes 37-44.
163 612 F.2d 84, 95-100 (3d Cir. 1979).
164 Pennhursi, 451 U.S. at 10-11.
163 Id. at 15.
166 Id.
163 Id. Section 5 provides: "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation," the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
5 5.
163 The spending clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 1, allows for Congress to provide
for the general welfare of the United States and when coupled with the necessary and proper
clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 18, el. 18, it provides a generalized source of congressional power
for federal funding statutes.
'" Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 15-17.
1° Id. at 16. This, the Court noted, was especially true where the asserted rights to
special kinds of treatment would entail the imposition of an affirmative funding obligation on the
States. Id. at 16-17.
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unambiguous conditions on the actual grant of federal money."'
Although dealing with each source separately, the Court applied a single
rule of construction to the Developmentally Disabled Act. The rule required a
clear expression of a congressional intent to impose upon states affirmative
obligations to fund certain entitlements before such obligations would be found
and enforced by the Court. Because the right that the plaintiff sought to enforce
— appropriate treatment for the mentally retarded in the least restrictive en-
vironment — would require "massive financial obligations" on the part of the
state rather than just a cessation of certain conduct, the Court was hesitant to
read into the statute a congressional intent to impose such obligations.'" The
Court, after discussing the purposes, legislative history, and plain language of
the Act,'" concluded that the federal-state funding statute in issue was
" 'designed as a cooperative program of shared responsibilit[ies], not as a
device for the Federal Government to compel a State to provide services that
Congress itself is unwilling to fund.' "' 74
 It therefore found only exhortatory
provisions and not obligatory conditions attached to the receipt of federal
funds.'" Thus, with the power of the fourteenth amendment not applicable
and the spending power applicable but requiring specific obligatory language
which the Court found lacking, no substantive rights could have been created
or, therefore, intended by the Developmentally Disabled Act." 6 The plaintiff's
possible private right of action under the bill of rights provision, therefore, was
neatly precluded."' As the bill of rights provision conferred no substantive
rights, it was also not necessary, the Court stated, to reach the parallel section
1983 claim."e
The plaintiffs also had sought the Court's aid in compelling the state to
comply with other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Act,'" which
required that certain "assurances" be made regarding the existence of
1 " Id. at 17-18.
'7  Id. at 16-17.
"3 Id. at 18-27.
"4 Id. at 22 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
'n Id. at 24.
16 Id. at 10-11.
177 Id. at 28 n.21.
"$ Id. The Court cited Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404
n.5 (1979), wherein the Court had expressed no view as to a parallel 5 1983 right of action as they
had resolved the case "on the merits", i.e. by statutory construction of the language of the
statute to preclude petitioner's factual situation. Whether or not Pennhurst is on the merits, a
1983 action would be precluded as it protects only rights. See supra notes 142-48 and accompany-
ing text.
L" 42 U.S.C. 5 6011 (1976 and Supp. III) (each state as a condition" of receiving
assistance must provide assurances to the federal government that programs receiving funds have
a habilitation plan for each developmentally disabled person under the program); 42 U.S.C. S
6063(b)(5)(C) (1976 and Supp. III) (requiring each plan to contain or be supported by assurances
that human rights of all persons with developmental disabilities receiving treatment under
assisted programs are protected consistent with section 6010, the "Bill of Rights" provision).
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habilitation plans and the protection of the participants' human rights as ex-
press conditions on the receipt of federal funds.' 8° The availability of equitable
relief to compel state compliance, Justice Rehnquist claimed, was dependent
on whether the plaintiffs had a private cause of action."' Although the usual
remedy for a state breach of federally imposed conditions was not a private
cause of action but an action by the federal government to terminate funds, the
Court noted the potential applicability of section 1983, as newly expanded by
Thiboutot, to include statutory violations.'" Because the court of appeals had
not addressed these issues, the Court remanded the case with instructions that
the court of appeals decide whether section 1983 creates a cause of action on the
basis of the following considerations: (1) whether an individual's interest in
having a state meet the conditions in the statute was a right secured by the laws
of the United States within the meaning of section 1983 and (2) whether the
statute provided the exclusive remedy for violations of the Act thus precluding
a section 1983 action. 1 "S
The parallels between the Court's treatment of whether the plaintiffs had
an implied private right of action to enforce their claimed rights and its instruc-
tions to the court of appeals regarding whether section 1983 provides an ex-
press cause of action are notable. On the implied right of action issue, the
Court increased the depth of the first Cort factor' 84 by looking to the intended
constitutional sources of power behind the specific statute in question to deter-
mine whether Congress could have intended to create enforceable rights and
obligations. Further, the Court concluded that Congress, while acting pur-
suant to section five of the fourteenth amendment, could not obligate the states
to provide expensive, least restrictive treatment since Congress had not con-
formed to the heretofore unannounced standard of clear expression. Further,
as a piece of spending power legislation, the Court, in essence, held that the
language in the Developmentally Disabled Act listing "rights" did not rise to
the level of an obligatory condition. There was, then, no express obligation or
right enforceable by anyone, particularly a plaintiff bringing a private action.
On the section 1983 issue, Pennhurst imposed two hurdles which a potential
plaintiff must clear — hurdles remarkably similar to those relevant to the im-
plied right of action analysis. According to the Court, a court must consider
whether there is a right secured and whether Congress intended to exclude a
section 1983 action.' 85
 As the Court has stressed that a private right of action is
180 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 27.
18 ' Id. at 27-28.
82 Id. at 28.
83 Id. at 28 & 30 (citing Justice Powell's dissent in Thiboutot). The Court also remanded
with instructions to consider whether or not an actual violation had occurred and the scope of any
remedy. Id. at 28-30. The Court further instructed the court of appeal to reconsider plaintiffs'
state law claim, federal constitutional claims, and claims under the federal Rehabilitation Act.
Id. at 30-31.
184 
"(I)s the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,' . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?" Cort, 422 U.S. at
78 (emphasis supplied).
i" See 451 U.S. at 28 Sr 30.
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more a question of who may enforce, a substantive right can be seen as the what
they may enforce. Asking what may be enforced seems to be the only valid
parallel between implied private rights of action and section 1983 actions. Cer-
tainly inquiry as to Congress' constitutional ability to impose obligations and
analysis of the express language to see if obligations actually are imposed seems
to be a proper function of the Court. On another level, however, the difference
between a private right of action and a substantive right in ultimate effect is not
clear, as the absence of a substantive right automatically precludes a private
right of action. Moreover, a private right of action is meaningless without a
substantive right to enforce (unless the statute provides for some other class to
enforce plaintiff's substantive rights).
Under the Pennhurst holdings, the questions are basically the same
regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks a remedy via section 1983 or an implied
private right of action. In both situations the question is whether there is a
substantive right and whether Congress intends to foreclose private actions. By
imposing the additional test of whether Congress has the clear intent to exercise
its power to create a substantive right, Pennhurst placed further limitations on
any court seeking to infer a private right of action or recognize section 1983 as
an express right of action. Moreover, the same rules of statutory construction
which have negatived private rights of action were now open to bar section
1983 from serving as an automatic right of action.
2. Sea Clammers
Two months after Pennhurst, the Court, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authori-
ty v. National Sea Clammers, 186 addressed more federal claims arising under com-
plex cooperative statutes which regulated ocean pollution.'" Justice Powell,
speaking for a seven member majority, held that no private right of action
could be inferred from the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA")
and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
("MPRSA"). 188 The plaintiffs, an organization whose members harvest fish
and shellfish and one individual member, sought relief from the alleged
damage to fishing grounds caused by discharges and ocean dumping of
sewage. 189 The defendants, various governmental entities and officials from
New York, New Jersey, and the federal government, had allegedly violated
provisions of the statutes — the federal defendants by permitting the state
defendants to dump in excess of federal limits and the state defendants by
violating the terms of federal permits.' 9° The plainti:Ffs sought injunctive and
declaratory relief as well as 500 million dollars in compensatory and punitive
186 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
IR? The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. $ 1251, et seq. (1976) (amended
1977), and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. 1401 et
seq. (1976) (amended 1977).
' 88 453 U.S. at 18.
'" Id. at 4-5.
' 8° Id. at 12.
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damages, basing their claims, inter alia, on an implied private right of action
theory and on a federal common law nuisance theory.'"
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants; finding
that private individuals could not bring a common law nuisance suit and
holding that the "citizen suit" provisions contained in the statute,' 92 which re-
quired sixty days notice and had not been complied with, precluded a right of
action.'" The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the findings of
the district court, holding instead that the existence of a "savings clause" 194
and an application of the Cort progeny indicated an implied private right of ac-
tion.'"
The Supreme Court, noting that the intent of the legislature was the crux
of the implied rights inquiry,' 98
 found that the comprehensive enforcement
provisions of the two acts compelled a finding that Congress did not intend ad-
ditional remedies.'" Justice Powell, writing for the majority, found that the
savings clause did not "preserve" an implied action, as it could not have been
intended to save rights under the Act itself,' 98 especially an implied action, in
light of the enforcement scheme already provided. 199 Citing Cort, Justice Powell
examined the legislative history of FWPCA and MPRSA and, again, found the
requisite Congressional intent to create a private right of action missing.200 As
to'the plaintiffs' nuisance claim, the Court found that the statutes had fully pre-
empted the federal common law of nuisance in the area of ocean pollution. 2°'
Interestingly, the Court gratuitously raised section 1983 as "a possible
alternative source of express congressional authorization of private suits" 02 2 to
enforce the Acts against the defendant municipal governmental entities. If sec-
191 Id. at 5 & n.6.
192 33 U.S.C. 1365(b)(1) (1976) and 33 U.S.C. 5 1415 (g)(2)(A) (1976) state that no
suit can be brought prior to sixty days after notice to the Environmental Protection Agency, the
State, and any alleged violator.
193 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 5-7.
14
 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(e) (1976) which states: "Nothing in this section shall restrict any
right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief
against the [EPA] or State agency)."
19' National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222, 1226-31 (1980).
' 96 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13.
127 Id. at 14-15.
199 Id. at 15. Although the savings clause did not say that it would only save "other"
remedies, Powell inferred this limitation from the legislative history. See id. at 16-17 & n.26.
199 Id. at 17.
u° Id. at 17-18. In dissent, Justice Stevens urged a return to the early common-law
analysis of Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916), preferring a presump-
tion in favor of any especial class to the intent analysis. Id. at 23-24 (Stevens, J., with Blackmun,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Noting that legislative history is
unlikely to reveal an intent to authorize that which it specifically failed to mention, Stevens thus
saw the developing intent analysis as a further restriction on the availability of private remedies.
Id. at 25.
20' Id. at 21-22.
202 Id. at 19 (emphasis by the Court).
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tion 1983 provided the cause of action, the Sea Clarnmers Court recognized,
there would have been no need for the foregoing implied right of action
analysis. 203
 Citing the Pennhurst advisory instructions as "exceptions" to the
general availability of section 1983 to remedy statutory violations, the Court
held that a section 1983 remedy was foreclosed. 204
 To reach this result, Justice
Powell tacitly modified the prong of the Pennhurst test which asked whether the
substantive statute provides the exclusive remedy (to which the savings clause
would have suggested a contrary answer) to the broader question of whether
Congress, by enacting the statute, had foreclosed private enforcement. 205
 To
answer the latter question, the Court then used the same remedial-intent
analysis of the implied right of action cases and held that in light of the com-
prehensive remedies already provided, Congress did not intend any private
rights of action. 206
 As to the savings clause, the Court found that this provi-
sion was evidence of "Congress' intent to allow further enforcement of an-
tipollution standards arising under other statutes or state common law. "2p7
Thus, since section 1983's substantive content is dependent entirely on the
statute whose violation a section 1983 plaintiff seeks to redress, section 1983,
while providing a remedy, contained no "rights" preservable by the savings
clause. 208
 With section 1983 foreclosed, the Court found it unnecessary to con-
sider the other Pennhurst hurdle: whether the Acts created any substantive
rights within the meaning of section 1983. 263
Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion, noted the Court's evolving restric-
tion of implied rights of action 210
 and disputed the section 1983 analysis. 21' The
issue, he stated, should not be the intent of Congress to preserve a section 1983
right of action, but rather the intent of Congress to withdraw section 1983. 212
Under the Court's analysis, Stevens claimed, the burden was impermissibly
shifted to the plaintiff to show Congress intended section 1983 to be applicable
to the specific statutory violation at issue. 213
 Instead, as section 1983 expressly
provides a private remedy applicable any time a violation of a federal statute is
alleged, he felt that the burden should be placed on the defendant to make out
the exception.'" Moreover, in Stevens' view, even if the comprehensiveness of




204 Id. at 20-21.
2" Id. at 20 n.31 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
208 Id.
709 Id. at 19.
210 Id. at 24-25 (Stevens, J., with Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
211
	 at 26-31 (Stevens, J., separate opinion).
212 Id. at 27 (Stevens, J., separate opinion).
213 Id. at 27 n.11 (Stevens, J., separate opinion) (rebutted by Justice Powell, id. at 20
n.31).
214
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press language elsewhere in the statute or clear references in the legislative
history. 215 Finding express language in the savings clause and clear references
in the history, Stevens concluded that the Court had not uncovered "a clear
congressional mandate" to preclude a section 1983 right of action. 216 In effect,
Stevens was arguing for a presumption in favor of the availability of a section
1983 action and a requirement that a strong showing be made that Congress
intended to remove the statute in issue from the section 1983 sphere of opera-
tion. In sum, rather than treat section 1983 actions as on par or equivalent to
implied rights of action as the majority does, Stevens seems to urge a more
liberal judicial approach to determinations of the applicability in section 1983
actions.
Thus, in Sea Clammers, the application of section 1983 to federal statutory
violations which was initiated by Thiboutot, and which had raised such concern
for Justice Powell, was, under Justice Powell's direction, narrowly con-
strained. The analysis applied to inferring a private right of action, therefore, is
now wedded to the section 1983 analysis. The availability of section 1983, an
express right of action, is now dependent on the "intent" of Congress to ex-
clude it and all private actions. This concentration on the legislative intent
evinces the Court's reluctance to create new rights, actions, or remedies on the
federal level without a strong indication of legislative design.
The line between statutory construction and judicial legislation is not
always clear. The thorny problem of determining the practical meaning and
application of modern federal legislation without engaging in judicial legisla-
tion is the task of a judiciary whose business is "to fashion remedies for
wrongs." 217 Despite the difficulty of the task, however, the propriety of analyz-
ing in a parallel fashion whether a statute falls within the sweep of section 1983
and whether a statute implies a private right of action can still be questioned.
In other words, the question is whether the rules of statutory construction used
to divine congressional intent in the implied right of action cases should be used
to negate a purely legislative cause of action. The standard which requires the
courts to ask whether Congress intended to preserve or foreclose a private ac-
tion and then to seek its answer by judicially-created rules of construction
designed to avoid the inference of a private right is, it will be argued, inap-
propriate to a section 1983 action.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Process of Finding Intent
Thiboutot's expansive interpretation of section 1983 to include statutory
rights violations necessarily overlapped with the implied private rights analysis
212
 Id. at 28.
216
	
at 30-31 (Stevens, J., separate opinion) (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23
(1980)).
21 Id. at 24 (Stevens, J., separate opinion).
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as each looks to a statute for the existence of a substantive right upon which a
claim for relief might be brought. It is not surprising then, that the Court, in
developing a method of analysis for the availability of section 1983 actions, has
adopted an analysis parallel to the private right of action analysis. Thus, in
both situations the Court asks essentially the same questions: whether Con-
gress intended to create substantive rights and whether it intended to include or
exclude a private action for their enforcement. The Court's repeated return to
Congressional intent as the central issue in right of action cases necessitates ex-
amining what is meant by Congressional intent and what standard is to be ap-
plied when seeking to interpret it. This section explores the meaning of Con-
gressional intent in order to shed further light on the hurdles facing the private
plaintiff seeking to redress a statutory violation.
Where there is no express provision for a private remedy in a statute, there
are at least three possibilities as to what Congress intended. It must have either
(1) intended a private remedy, (2) intended that there be no private remedy, or
(3) not contemplated the issue at al1. 2 " A fourth and possibly more realistic
alternative is that different members of Congress felt differently about the
propriety of granting a private right of action. Thus, the statute can be con-
sidered a political compromise serving contradictory purposes and containing
ambiguous wording orchestrated to avoid the appearance of offense. Within
such a statute, there is also the possibility that various factions have left in place
vague language which they hope will be construed by the judiciary in their
favor. With these possibilities in mind, the task of the Court is indeed a difficult
one. There are several, not entirely separable, problems facing a court seeking
the intent of Congress. First, how do the courts uncover congressional intent?
Second, and especially pertinent when it is difficult to glean any clear
legislative intent, what are the underlying values that determine the role of the
Court in such inquiries? Third, just how much evidence of intent will satisfy
the Court that Congress intended a certain result?
The methodology of the Court's intent inquiry has been fairly straightfor-
ward. To find the intent to allow or deny a private right to sue, the Court has
looked, first, to the plain language of the statute.'" Second, the Court has ex-
amined the statute's structure and the relationship of the statute's various pro-
visions. 22° Finally, the purposes stated in the statute's title, preamble, or ex-
pressly or implicitly contained in the legislative history have been assessed. 221
More recently, after examining the express remedial structure of the act in
question, the Court has applied rules of statutory construction to reach an end
result. Rules of statutory construction are not, however, realistically reflective
of congressional intent as shown by the Court's refusal to infer a private
219 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 874A, comment c (1979) (Tort Liability for
Violation of Legislative Provision).
219 See, e.g., Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 689.
21° Set, e.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560, 571-72.
221 See, e.g., Cort, 422 U.S. 66, 84.
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remedy when it finds remedies are expressly provided, 222
 elaborately pro-
vided, 223 and not provided at al1. 22+ The rules, as presently applied by the
Court, more often than not preclude a private right of action.
Underlying the apparently mechanical methodology employed in discern-
ing congressional intent is a broader problem which influences the choice of
methods as well as the outcome of the Courts' search for intent. The problem
arises when the Court's scrutiny shades from a search for literal intent to
"figurative" intent: a retrospective filling in by the Court of how the enacting
Congress would have dealt with the particular problem at hand had it con-
sidered it, or a search for policies behind the statute which would be served by a
private cause of action. 225
 It is at this point that the judicial search for congres-
sional intent requires the Court to make policy decisions and value judgments
regarding the statute at issue. 226
The extent to which the Court will make these policy decisions and value
judgments depends on their own perceived role vis-a-vis the legislature, the
states, and the injured parties. In defining this role, typical concerns voiced by
the Court in the past have included the scope of the federal courts'
jurisdiction, 227
 the balance of powers between the legislative and judicial
branches, 228
 the sheer bulk and quality of federal legislation, 22 ° and the balance
between state and federal government. 23° Striking a balance among these often
competing, constantly shifting considerations is no easy task. The intent
analysis itself is an attempt to defer any resolution of these issues to Congress.
Yet this deference is a value judgment in itself for it manifests an attitude of
judicial restraint which sees the federal lawmaking power as vested in the
222
	 444 U.S. at 20.
223 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 14.
224 California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 296 & 298.
223 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 874A, comment d (1979).
226 Id.
This process [of divining intent] requires policy decisions by the court, and it
should be aware of them and face them candidly. In these cases, it is the court itself
that is according the civil remedy to the injured party. The action is in furtherance
of the purpose of the legislation and is stimulated by it, but what is involved is
judicial rather than legislative modification of the existing law. The court is not re-
quired to provide the civil remedy, and yet judicial tradition gives it the authority
to do this under appropriate circumstances.
Id. at 303.
227 See, e.g., Chapman, 441 U.S. at 645 (Powell, J., concurring) ("If S 1983 provides a
private cause of action for the infringement, under color of state law, of any federal right, then
virtually every [joint federal-state] program, together with the state officials who administer it,
becomes subject to judicial oversight at the behest of a single citizen, even if such a dramatic ex-
pansion of federal-court jurisdiction never would have been countenanced when these programs
were adopted.").
229 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (federal law-
making vested in the legislative — not the judicial — branch of government).
229 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 24-25 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
230 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
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legislative, not the judicial branch of government."' This restrictive position
stands in marked contrast to the earlier, more activist view that the federal
court's power to infer a private remedy is concomitant with the authority
reserved by judicial tradition, i.e. the authority to choose among traditional
judicial remedies to further substantive policies embodied in an act of law."'
Alternatively, the remedial power also could be seen as a necessary corollary to
the fashioning of federal law when federal rights are involved."' Thus, where
the intent of Congress is not clear, these conflicting judicial values and policies
necessarily affect whether or not a private right of action can and will be
"found."
One way of fixing or limiting the influx of judicial value judgments in the
Court's examination of congressional intent is to set a standard. The quantum
of intent necessary to find a right of action has not been stated by the Court. At
present, the Court seeks to discern a direction, either favoring or countering a
private right of action. 234
 But there have been alternatives proposed. Justice
Powell, in his dissent in Cannon, urged that there be "most compelling
evidence" before a court could find that Congress intended a private right of
action. 235
 Justice Stevens, in his dissent and concurrence in Sea Clammers, urged
that a "clear congressional mandate" to preclude section 1983 be made out
before a court could find that Congress had intended to withdraw section 1983
from providing a remedy for the statute in issue. 236 Lastly, in a related
analysis, Justice Rehnquist applied a standard of clear expression to the history
and language of an act in order to discern whether Congress intended to create
substantive rights under the spending power. 2 " The aim of these proposed
higher threshold requirements is to place a burden on Congress to provide ex-
plicitly for private rights of action. The effect is that a greater showing would be
required before the will of Congress would be perceived by the courts.
Certainly, by demanding a higher threshold showing of intent, a greater
burden is placed on Congress to provide a right of action and the Court is
prevented thereby from engaging in judicial legislation. Yet, even without a
higher threshold requirement, the Court has had little trouble denying a
private right of action by the use of rigid statutory construction rules and the
231
 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981).
232 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, 5 874A, comment d at 303 (1979). The
judicial power to fashion remedies was certainly a factor in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Nar-
cotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Here, the Court inferred a remedy against a federal officer
for an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 391 & 397. In
a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan noted the existence of the Court's power, id. at 402 & n.4,
and analogized the Court's inference of a right of action from a constitutional provision to what
was liberally done in the cases which had inferred a private right from a statute. Id.
233
 Borak, 377 U.S. at 434.
234
 See supra text subsequent note 79.
235 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
236 Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 31 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
2" Pennhursi, 451 U.S. at 24.
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acceptance of a relatively small quantum of negative intent to tip the balance.
But, the various devices used by the Court to discern congressional intent
should not obscure the fact that real choices are being made by the judiciary
whenever the express language is not dispositive. The sheer number of concur-
rences and dissents which manifest a reading of the intent of Congress at
variance with the majority's reading would itself suggest the unreliability of the
particular intent analysis — whether based on a multi-factor approach, a
simple presumption, or rules of statutory construction.
By imposing a higher threshold requirement, although in itself a fairly ar-
bitrary decision, the Court would at least send a strong signal to Congress to be
more explicit in the area of private rights of action to enforce congressionally
created federal rights. In addition, such a move would restrain judicial ac-
tivism. Alternatively, one could argue in favor of leaving the requirements
where they stand but eliminating the rules of statutory construction which,
rather than aiding the Court, appear arbitrary in operation and predetermine
the result. Whatever the shortcomings of the Court's present intent analysis, it
has been applied to section 1983 actions with similar, predictable results.
Whether this should obtain or not remains to be discussed.
B. Applying the Intent Analysis to Section 1983.
Little attention was placed by the Pennhurst and Sea Clammers opinions on
the role of section 1983 in federal law: its purposes, its intended relationship to
other laws, and its function as a right of action. Both Pennhurst and Sea Clammers
required section 1983 actions based on statutory violations to conform to the
Court's pre-existing analysis for implied private rights of action based on
statutory violations. Thus, the potential paradox implicit in the possibility that
a plaintiff might be found to have a right of action via section 1983 but be
denied a private right of action was avoided by an analysis inclusive of both
potential rights of action. But the paradox disappears when one considers that
section 1983 has as its purpose the provision of a federal forum to protect
federal rights from abuse by state actors. A sense of conflict, however, is more
acute when the plaintiff seeks relief from both federal and state actors either by
section 1983 or by private right of action. In this situation, the possibility of
finding no implied right of action available against the federal actors but a sec-
tion 1983 action available against the state actors would render the state actors
the obvious and preferred target, and, to some, a victim of such disparate treat-
ment. 238
The solution to this dilemma rightfully belongs in Congress, not the
courts. By enacting section 1983, Congress created a generic right of action for
deprivations of federal rights under color of state law. Ostensibly, it is within
2  An additional factor supporting the preference of a state actor as a defendant is that
the state actor, unlike federal actors, can be made to pay attorney's fees to the successful 1983
plaintiff. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. S 1988 (1976 & Supp. III).
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Congress' power to create a federal counterpart to "section 1983" which vin-
dicates deprivations caused by actors under color of federal law. Further, sec-
tion 1983 is a legislative, express cause of action, noi. a judicial remedy. Any
decision to deny a cause of action contrary to its terms should be premised on a
legislative directive of similarly clear expression. A substantive statute's preclu-
sion of the section 1983 cause of action should not be found without express
direction and should not be judicially inferred by the use of rules of statutory
construction previously developed by the courts to limit their own creativity. In
light of the deterrent purposes behind section 1983, a plaintiff should not be
automatically precluded from a court's scrutiny of the merits behind the de-
fendant's alleged abuse of plaintiff's statutory rights. Nor does it seem
unreasonable that Congress, in providing remedial schemes replete with ad-
ministrative proceedings and citizen suit provisions within the substantive
statute, also might have concluded that private access to the federal forum is
necessary to serve as a further check on the state participants in joint federal-
state regulatory endeavors, federal actors already being under sufficient ex-
ecutive and legislative control. Further, the feared financial exposure of local
government units is more appropriately a question of the type of relief accorded
— e.g. injunctive or damages — not the threshold right to relief. 239
To this end a test of clear expression is endorsed. Although it is relevant to
examine whether Congress had intended to preclude a section 1983 action, the
scrutiny for such a search should be more restricted than with implied rights.
As suggested by Justice Stevens in Sea Clammers, a strong presumption should
exist that the scope of section 1983 includes the statute in issue unless by "ex-
press statutory language or clear reference 240 there appears, in the substan-
tive statute, a "clear congressional mandate to withdraw the section 1983
remedy ." 2'n A comprehensive scheme of other remedies in the substantive
statute does not necessarily weigh against a finding that section 1983 has not
been foreclosed, and should not be conclusive absent further congressional
statement. If the Thiboutot recognition of section 1983's applicability to federal
statutes is to be retained, the Court should leave to Congress the task of solving
the various federalism and balance of power issues and assume that the scope of
section 1983 has not been foreclosed by the unexpressed intent of Congress. To
do otherwise, would denigrate the purposes of section 1983, narrow the sec-
tion's scope and leave its application to statutory violations subject to the very
same judicial speculation the Court has sought so assiduously to avoid in the
past.
299 Cf. case cited supra note 124.
2*° Sea Clammers, 433 U.S. at 30 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
2' Id. at 31. (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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CONCLUSION
The currently articulated principles governing the Court's search for an
implied private right of action pivot on the intent of Congress to create substan-
tive rights and to provide or deny a private action for their enforcement.
Although pointing to the express language, the legislative history, and the
remedial structure of the act in issue, the Court has repeatedly approached the
problem of congressional intent with rules of statutory construction. As cur-
rently applied by the Court, these rules predetermine the result and nearly
always lead to a finding that a private right of action is barred. In those situa-
tions where section 1983 would be potentially available as an alternative
private right of action, the Court has imposed the implied private rights
analysis on any decision as to whether section 1983 might also provide a
remedy. Asking whether Congress intended to exclude or include a private
right of action, however, should not be the same as asking whether Congress
intended to foreclose a section 1983 right of action. Unlike the judicially in-
ferred "implied" right of action, section 1983 is an express statutory cause of
action which seeks to provide a remedy for the infringements of rights secured
by federal statutes or the Constitution. Further, section 1983 serves to deter
abuses of power by those acting under color of state law, compensates the in-
jured, and provides a federal forum to hear their claims. For these reasons, sec-
tion 1983 should be presumed to be applicable if the plaintiff comes within its
terms unless a clear expression of congressional intent to withdraw the remedy
can be made out from the sued upon statute. Such a test seeks to firmly place
the burden of withdrawing section 1983 into the hands of the legislature and
out of the Court's since the all too malleable intent analysis is highly suscep-
tible to the importation of judicial values and speculation.
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